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IN THE UTVT COURT O^ APPEALS 
STATE OF UTATT, 
Plaintiff-Appellee ) Case No. 920341-CA 
vs . 
DON W. DUNBAR, Priority No, 2 
- * ^eilant ) 
BRIE* •,, At t ^  ..i.,. 
JURISDICTION AND NA'I 
This is ar. J: pt.ii : r- ID . * dgment '- ,'iri,,i;'- Court ot 
the First Jiidir: - j'strirt J; I!« State . .1 ard for the 
( • 1 
May ?.
 % 1 ^ 9 , 1 : r. • 1 i •% r tit- defendant guiiiv ,:, t.i.vii.u * 1. bubpuiibion, 
a Clafi (" v sdemeano? I'-H^  r«u -r ,j Appeals has i.:risdi. tior: 
I i l l . ; 
C.w'i' r v .- ' o . ^ amendec . , s ippea . ..- Fken ov *_jt- d e i ^ n d a n t 
u n d e r *-* i r *:'>< • ; ^ri - r) ;»» t h^ r* •*- I ' ^ n s t ' * u t i < ^ n . Se l i o n s 
p u r ^ u a r t : - fc? * 1 * ' i c - at, K ..« s :" C r imina l : r o c e d u r e . 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. The trial court erred by not granting the motion to dismiss 
for lack of a speedy trial. The issue is a question of law and the 
Standard of Review is a "correction of error11 standard. [See 
State v. Johnson, 771 P 2d 326 (Utah App. 1989).] 
2. The trial court erred by not granting the motion to dismiss 
for denial of equal protection and due process. The issue is a ques-
tion of law and the Standard of Review is a "correction of error" 
standard. (See State v. Johnson, supra.) 
3. Where a traffic offense occurs partly in a jurisdiction 
that has a justice court and it is a Class C Misdemeanor, a Circuit 
Court has no jurisdiction. The Standard of Review is "de novo" where 
the question is whether the trial court had jurisdiction as a matter 
of law. [See Barlow v. Cappo, 821 P 2d 465, (Utah App. 1991).] 
4. The trial court erred by not requiring the clerk to draw 
the jury panel by lot instead of seating the panel in alphabetical 
order. The Standard of Review is a "correction of error" standard. 
(See State v. Johnson, supra.) 
5. Where the prospective jurors were not willing to give the 
defendant the presumption of innocence if he chose not to testify 
the entire panel should have been discharged. The Standard of 
Review is a "correction of error" standard. (See State v. Johnson, 
supra.) 
6. The trial court erred by not declaring a mistrial when 
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viewed in a light most favorable to the jury verdict is sufficient 
to support the jury verdict. [See State v. Singer, 815 P 2d 1303 
(Utah App. 1991). 
11. The trial court erred by not sua sponte requiring another 
bailiff to attend the proceedings on April 3, 1992 and April 24, 
1992 where the information showed the bailiff was the only witness 
for the state in this case. The Standard of Review is an abuse of 
discretion determination. (See Logan City v. Carlsen, supra.) 
12. The trial court erred by not ruling upon the state's 
motion to amend the information made on April 3, 1992 to change the 
date of the offense to May 16, 1991 as with the motion pending the 
defendant could not present evidence of an alibi nor could the 
defendant exercise his right to testify in his own behalf without 
knowing with certainty the date of the alleged offense. The Standard 
of Review is a "correction of error11 standard. (See State v. Johnson, 
supra.) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Issue No. 1: 
a. Amendment VI of the United States Constitution reads as 
follows: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State 
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to 
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
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b. Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution reads as 
follows: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district 
in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any 
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance 
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The 
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, 
nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice 
put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
c. Section 77-1-6 (l)(f) Utah Code Ann. 1953, reads as follows: 
In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled . . To a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict where the offense is alleged to have been committed; 
d. Rule 25(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure reads 
as follows: 
The court shall dismiss the information or indictment when: 
(1) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional delay in bring-
ing defendant to trial. 
Issue No. 2: 
a. Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution reads in 
part as follows: 
. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
b. Article I, Sections 7 and 24 of the Utah Constitution read 
as follows: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
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All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
c. Section 41-6-167 Utah Code Ann. 1953 reads as follows: 
(a) Upon any violation of this act punishable as a misdemeanor, 
whenever a person is (not) immediately taken before a magistrate 
as hereinbefore provided, the police officer shall prepare in 
triplicate or more copies a written notice to appear in court 
containing the name and address of such person, the number, 
if any, of his operator's license, the registration number of 
his vehicle, the offense charged, and the time and place when 
and where such person shall appear in court. 
(b) The time specified in said notice to appear must be at least 
five days after such arrest unless the person arrested shall de-
mand an earlier hearing. 
(c) The place specified in said notice to appear must be made 
before a magistrate within the county in which the offense 
charged is alleged to have been committed and who has jurisdiction 
of such offense. 
(d) The arrested person, in order to secure release as provided 
in this section, must give his written promise satisfactory to 
the arresting officer so to appear in court by signing at least 
one copy of the written notice prepared by the arresting officer. 
The officer shall deliver a copy of such notice to the person 
promising to appear. Thereupon, said officer shall forthwith 
release the person arrested from custody. 
(e) Any officer violating any of the provisions of this section 
shall be guilty of misconduct in office and shall be subject 
to removal from office. 
d. Section 41-6-169 Utah Code Ann. 1953 reads as follows: 
The foregoing provisions of this act shall govern all police 
officers in making arrests without warrant for violations of 
this act, but the procedure prescribed herein shall not other-
wise be exclusive of any other method prescribed by law for 
the arrest and prosecution of a person for an offense of like 
grade. 
e. Rule 6(a) Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure reads in part 
as follows: 
. . Upon the filing of an information, if it appears from the 
information, or from any affidavit filed with the information, 
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that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has 
been committed and that the accused has commited it, the 
magistrate shall cause to issue either a warrant for the arrest 
or a summons for the appearance of the accused. 
Issue No. 3: 
a. Sections 77-7-19(4)(a) and (b), 77-25-1, 78-4-5 and 78-
5-104, Utah Code Ann. 1953, read as follows: 
77-7-19(4)(a) Except where otherwise provided by law, a 
citation or information issued for violations of Title 41 
shall state that the person receiving the citation or 
information shall appear before the magistrate who has 
jurisdiction over the offense charged. 
(b) If the citation or information is issued for an offense 
under the jurisdiction of the justice courts and occurs within 
the geographical boundaries of any municipality or county 
precinct where a justice court exists and a justice court judge 
is currently serving, that court is the magistrate before 
whom the person shall appear. 
77-25-1 The jurisdiction of justice courts, except as other-
wise provided by law, shall extend to the limits of the county 
in which the justice court is located. 
78-4-5 Circuit courts have jurisdiction over Class A Misdemeanors. 
Circuit courts have jurisdiction over class B misdemeanors 
classified by Title 41, Chapter 6, Article 5, Driving While In-
toxicated and Reckless Driving, ordinances that comply with 
the requirements of Section 41-6-43, and class B misdemeanors 
classified by any title other than Title 41. Circuit courts 
have jurisdiction over all related misdemeanors arising out 
of a single criminal episode. When a justice court is given 
jurisdiction of a criminal matter and there is no justice 
court with territorial jurisdiction, the circuit court shall 
have jurisdiction. The circuit court shall retain jurisdiction 
over cases properly filed in the circuit court prior to January 
1, 1992. The circuit court shall have jurisdiction as provided 
in Section 10-3-923. 
[78-4-5 in effect on June 3, 1991 provides in part as follows: 
(l)(c) All complaints for offenses charged under Title 41 
except offenses charged under Article 5, Chapter 6, Title 41, 
shall be filed in the municipal justice court or the county 
justice court where the offense occurred if those justice courts 
exist and have jurisdiction of the offenses. 
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78-5-104 (1) Justice courts have jurisdiction over class B 
and C misdemeanors, violations of ordinances, and infractions 
committed within their territorial jurisdiciton, except those 
offenses over which the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction. 
[On June 3,1991 78-5-104 provided in part as follows: (2)(a) 
Municipal justice courts have exclusive original jurisdiction 
over the following offense committed within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the court: (i) all city or town ordinances; and 
(ii) offenses charged under Title 41 except driving under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs, driving with a blood alcohol 
content of .08% or higher, and reckless driving. 
b. Rule 7(2) Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as 
follows: 
When any peace officer or other person makes an arrest with 
or without a warrant, the person arrested shall be taken to a 
magistrate under Section 77-7-19. If a magistrate is not 
available in the circuit or precinct, the person arrested shall 
be taken to the nearest available magistrate for setting of 
bail. If an information has not been filed, one shall be 
filed without delay before the magistrate having jurisdiction 
over the offense. 
c. Rule 5(e) and 81 (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provide as follows: 
(5)(e) The filing of pleadings and other papers with the court 
as required by these rules shall be made by filing them with 
the clerk of the court, except that the judge may permit the 
papers to be filed with him, in which event he shall note thereon 
the filing date and forthwith transmit them to the office of the 
clerk, if any. 
(81)(e) These rules of procedure shall also govern in any 
aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other 
applicable statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied 
does not conflict with any statutory or constitutional re-
quirement . 
Issue No. 4: 
a. Rule 18(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides 
as follows: 
The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number of jurors 
that are to try the cause plus such an additional number as 
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will allow for all peremptory challenges permitted. . . 
When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall 
make a list of the jurors remaining, and each side, beginning 
with the prosecution, shall indicate thereon its peremptory 
challenge to one juror at a time in regular turn, as the court 
may direct, until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or 
waived. The clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so 
many of them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury, in 
the order in which they appear on the list, and the persons whose 
names are so called shall constitute the jury. 
Issue No. 5: 
a. Rule 18(e)(14) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides as follows: 
(the challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror 
and may be taken on one or more of the following grounds: 
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part of the juror 
with reference to the cause, or to either party, which will 
prevent him from acting impartially and without prejudice 
to the substantial rights of the party challenging; but no 
person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having 
formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be 
submitted to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements 
in public journals or common notoriety, if it satisfactorily 
appears to the court that the juror can and will, notwithstand-
ing such opinion act impartially and fairly upon the matter to 
be submitted to him. 
Issue No. 6: 
a. Rule 611 (a) Utah Rules of Evidence provides as follows: 
The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode 
and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence 
so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective 
for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consump-
tion of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue 
embarrassment. 
Issue Nos. 7 and 8: 
a. Sections 41-2-102(25), 41-2-104, 41-2-136, 41-12a-412 
read as follows: 
41-2-102(25) [In effect in May 1991 (now appears as subsection 
27)] "Suspension" means the temporary withdrawal by action of 
the division of a licensee's privilege to operate a motor vehicle. 
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41-2-10i(l) No person except one expressly exempted under 
Section 41-2-107, 41-2-108, or 41-2-111, or Subsection 41-2-
121(4), or Chapter 22, Title 41, may operate a motor vehicle 
on a highway in this state unless the person is licensed as 
an operator by the division under this chapter. 
41-2-136(1) and (2) A person whose license has been denied, 
suspended, disqualified, or revoked under this chapter and 
operates any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state 
while that license is denied, suspended, disqualified, or 
revoked shall be punished as provided in this section. 
A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (1), other than 
a violation specified in Subsection (3), is guilty of a Class 
C Misdemeanor. 
41-12a-412(l) No motor vehicle may be registered in the name of 
any person required to file proof of owner's security unless 
proof of that security is furnished for the motor vehicle. 
(2) Whenever the department lawfully suspends or revokes the 
driverfs license of any person upon receiving record of a 
conviction or a forfeiture of bail, the department shall 
also suspend the registration for all motor vehicles registered 
in the name of the person. However, the department may not 
suspend the person1s motor vehicle registration, unless other-
wise required by law, if the person has given or immediately 
gives and then maintains proof of owner's security for all motor 
vehicles registered by the person. 
(3) Licenses and registrations suspended or revoked under 
this section may not be renewed, nor may any driver's 
license thereafter be issued, nor may any motor vehicle be 
thereafter registered in the name of the person until he 
gives and thereafter maintains proof of owner's security. 
(4) If a person is not licensed, but by final order or judgment 
is convicted or forfeits any bail or collateral deposited to 
secure an appearance for trial for any offense requiring 
suspension or revocation of license, or for operating an 
unregistered motor vehicle upon the highways, no license may 
may thereafter be issued to the person and no motor vehicle may 
continue to be registered in his name until he gives and 
thereafter maintains proof of owner's security. 
(5) Whenever the department suspends or revokes a nonresident's 
operating privilege by reason of a conviction or forfeiture of 
bail, this privilege remains suspended or revoked unless the 
person has given or immediately gives and thereafter maintains 
proof of owner's security. 
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Issue No. 9: 
a. Rule 18(a) Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure reads as follows: 
The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number of the jurors 
that are to try the case plus such an additional number as will 
allow for all preemptory challenges permitted. After each 
challenge for cause sustained, another juror shall be called to 
fill the vacancy before further challenges are made, and any 
such new juror may be challenged for cause. When the challenges 
for cause are completed, the clerk shall make a list of the 
jurors remaining, and each side, beginning with the prosecution, 
shall indicate thereon its preemptory challenge to one juror 
at a time in regular turn, as the court may direct, until all 
preemptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall 
then call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be 
necessary to constitute the jury, in the order in which they 
appear on the list, and the persons whose names are so called 
shall constitute the jury. 
Issue No. 10: 
a. Section 76-2-101 Utah Code Ann. 1953 reads as follows: 
No person is guilty of an offense unless his conduct is prohibited 
by law and: 
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with 
criminal negligence, or with a mental state otherwise specified 
in the statute defining the offense, as the definition of the 
offense requires; or 
(2) His acts constitute an offense involving strict 
liability. 
These standards of criminal responsibility shall not apply to 
the violations set forth in Title 41, Chapter 6, unless speci-
fically provided by law. 
b. Section 76-2-102 Utah Code Ann. 1953 reads as follows: 
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a 
culpable mental state, and when the definition of the offense 
does not specify a culpable mental state and the offense does 
not involve strict liability, intent, knowledge, or recklessness 
shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility. An offense 
shall involve strict liability if the statute defining the offense 
clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose criminal 
responsibility for commission of the conduct prohibited by the 
statute without requiring proof of any culpable mental state. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
An Information was filed on June 6, 1991 charging the defendant 
with Driving on Suspension, a Class C Misdemeanor, and summons was 
served on the defendant on June 3, 1991 just prior to his entrance 
in Court on another case. (R. 183-5) (T-3 6-7) [Reference to April 
3, 1992 transcript will be T-3, April 24, 1992 T-24, and May 8, 1992 
T-8.] On January 31 1992 defendant was arraigned and an attorney was 
appointed on February 4, 1992 (R 171, 175), and after some preliminary 
motions the defendant was tried by a jury on May 8, 1992 and found 
guilty and was sentenced to 30 days in jail to be suspended upon pay-
ment of a fine of $150.00. (R 21) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 3, 1991 James Meacham, the bailiff in Judge Roger S. 
Dutsonfs court in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District, 
State of Utah, in and for the County of Cache (T-3 5-6), went before 
the Honorable Clint Judkins, another judge in the First Circuit, and 
swore to an information charging the defendant with the crime of 
Driving on Suspension, a Class C Misdemeanor (R 186), alleged to have 
occurred on May 17, 1991 in Cache County, Utah. Just prior to a 
hearing on another matter in First Circuit Court set for 4 p.m. on 
June 3, 1991 in Judge Dutson1s court room the defendant was served with 
a summons requiring him to appear on the first Tuesday after service 
which would be the next day, June 4, 1991 (R 183-185). It is 
not clear who served the summons as the summons shows it was served 
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by D. R. Meacham (R. 185), another deputy Cache County Sheriff, 
but James Meacham testified that he served the summons (T-3 6, T-8 
68). 
No citation had ever been given to the defendant and officer 
Meacham testified when he claimed to have seen the defendant driving 
he did not stop him (T-8 64). Officer Meacham also testified 
that on or about the same time he claimed to have seen another 
person whom he thought was driving on suspension and he did not 
stop him either and give him a citation, but he did place him under 
arrest about ten minutes after he claims to have seen him driving 
(T-8 64). 
Even though James Meacham was the bailiff in Judge Dutsonfs 
court room in First Circuit Court, he did not inform Judge Dutson 
that he had just served the defendant the summons in this matter 
even though the defendant was present in court and appearing before 
Judge Dutson on another matter (T-3 7). 
There is no notation on the information as required by Rule 
5(e) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (made applicable to criminal 
procedure by Rule 81(e) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) so it is 
apparent that Judge Judkins did not permit the filing of the 
information with him (R. 186) . The information was not in fact 
filed with the clerk of the court until June 6, 1991 at 11:08 a.m. 
or two days after the date the defendant was supposed to appear 
and answer to the Information (R. 186) . 
On January 31, 1992 the defendant was arrested on another 
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matter and for the first time learned that an Information had been 
filed on June 6, 1991 or two days after he was supposed to appear 
(R. 172-3). 
Even though the defendant was indigent he was ordered to plead 
without being furnished counsel and counsel was not appointed until 
February 4, 1992 (R. 171). 
On February 7, 1992 the court appointed counsel moved to dismiss 
under the United States and Utah Constitutions for failure to grant 
a speedy trial and because of denial of equal protection and due 
process (R. 147 ). At the hearing on this motion James Meacham 
testified the alleged driving took place on Thursday (which would 
be May 16, 1991) and the state moved to amend the information. (T-.3 12) 
The court did not rule on the state's motion, but took it under 
advisement and denied the defendant's motions on April 3, 1992. 
(Tr3 28) 
Through discovery the defendant learned that most of the alleged 
driving took place in River Heights, Utah and on March 31, 1992 the 
defendant moved to dismiss because the Circuit Court did not have 
jurisdiction over a Class C Misdemeanor traffic offense (R.115-118). 
This motion was denied by the trial court on April 24, 1992 (TT24 9) 
A jury trial was set for May 8, 1992. The Clerk did not draw 
the names of the prospective jurors by lot as required by Rule 18(a) 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, but the 15 jurors summoned 
were seated in aphabetical order (T-8 2, R. 36). 
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During the examination of the 15 jurors defendant's counsel asked 
the jurors if they would give the defendant the presumption of innocence 
(T-8 27-8). Many jurors indicated they would not so the Court explain-
ed the rule regarding presumption of innocence and defendant's counsel 
asked the panel if the defendant does not take the witness stand fldo 
any of you feel . . if . . a juror was in your present frame of mind 
you would want that person to sit on a jury" (T-8 33). Only juror 
Linda Price answered in the affirmative (T-8 34) and she was removed by 
the State's second peremptory (R 36). Defendant's motion to discharge 
the entire panel was not recorded so it was renewed to clarify the re-
cord (T-8 34, 98). The court denied the motion off the record. 
Counsel for the defendant did not accept the jury but the Court 
ordered counsel to select the jury by exercising their peremptory 
challenges from the panel as seated in alphabetical order and not 
as drawn by lot (T-8 2) (R 36). 
During the trial even though the Court had previously ruled there 
could be no evidence presented of driving in River Heights (T-24 5, 
8-11) counsel for the plaintiff elicited this information from the 
only witness by asking the officer how far he had followed the defend-
ant after he first observed him at Third South and Main and he answered 
"mile and a half to two miles" which placed the defendant in River 
Heights for most of the driving (T-8 56). 
State introduced Exhibit "1" (R 76) the driving record of one 
Don W. Dunbar, but no evidence was presented that this was the same 
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Don W. Dunbar as was being tried (T-8 80, 81). 
Exhibit "l11 also showed that this Don W. Dunbar's license had 
expired on December 18, 1989 (one and one half years before being 
charged with driving on suspension). The defendant moved to dismiss 
on the grounds that the proper offense was driving without a license 
under Section 41-2-104 Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, since the 
license had expired and could no longer be suspended and for the 
Statefs failure to show that the defendant had been given notice of 
suspension. (Both motions were denied.) (T-8 75-81.) 
The defendant also requested an instruction that the jury could 
find the defendant guilty of driving without a license, a lesser 
offense of an infraction, but this was also denied. (T-8 91-93.) 
During the trial the prosecuting attorney informed the Court 
that in the presence of a juror (Don Corbridge) who later became 
the foreman he had discussed the case with the only witness, James 
Meacham, in the court house lobby. The Court quizzed the juror, 
but all the juror could remember is that ffI remember hearing Mr. 
Perry's name" but he could not recall anything else. The defendant 
moved for a mistrial which was denied (T-8 81-85). 
This overheard conversation takes on additional significance 
because of the affidavit attached to the motion for a certificate 
of probable cause as it appears the juror had an adverse interest to 
the defendant's attorney and may not have been unbiased (R 8-9). 
The defendant did not testify (T-8 93). 
The jury found the defendant guilty of driving on suspension 
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and the defendant was sentenced to pay a fine of $150 and serve 30 
days in the Cache County Jail with the days in jail suspended upon 
payment of the fine. (R. 21) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A speedy trial is said to be a trial conducted according to 
fixed rules, regulations, and proceedings of law, free from 
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. The failure of the 
State of Utah to file the Information before issuing a summons, the 
failure to arraign the defendant on the information when he was 
present in court or to notify him of a date certain in which he 
was to appear and thus allowing almost eight months to elapse 
before the defendant knew he would need an alibi defense to defend 
himself all compel the conclusion that under the eight factors 
listed by the appellate courts the defendant was denied a speedy 
trial. 
Equal protection and due process demand that the defendant be 
treated the same as all persons charged with an offense. The failure 
to issue a citation to the defendant when the officer claims to have 
observed him driving or in the alternative to place him under arrest, 
and the failure to file an information before issuing a summons, and 
the failure to permit him to be arraigned on an information sworn 
to but purposely not filed until after the defendant had left the 
court on another matter all tend to show the defendant was not treated 
the same as other persons charged with traffic misdemeanors. 
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Sections 77-7-19(4)(b) and 78-4-5 Utah Code Ann. 1953, as 
amended, in effect in May 1991 require the offense to be filed 
in the justice court having jurisdiction where one was in existence 
at the time of offense and the offense occurred within its 
jurisdiction. Section 78-4-5, Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, 
in effect when the defendant made his first appearance in January 
1992 divests the Circuit Court of jurisdiction where the case was 
not properly filed in May or June 1991. 
Rule 18(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly 
requires the jurors to be drawn by lot and not arranged in alpha-
betical order as was done by the trial court. 
The defendant is entitled to be tried by an impartial jury 
and where alL the jurors but one refused to give him the presumption 
of innocence and felt in their own minds they would not like a juror 
in their frame of mind to try them if they were the defendant and 
especially where it subsequently appeared that one juror could have 
possibly been prejudiced against the defendant's attorney, the entire 
panel should have been discharged and a new panel selected. 
Under its authority in Rule 611 (a) of the Rules of Evidence 
the Court should enforce its orders made in pre-trial conference by 
declaring a mistrial when the prosecution violates the rule, especially 
where the defendant has given a notice of alibi and allowing the 
additional evidence may have interferred with the election to 
testify. 
As written the laws of the State of Utah should not be inter-
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preted as continuing the period of suspension after a driver's 
license has expired by its terms. 
Where the facts before the Court can be interpreted by the 
jury in one of two ways, either that the defendant's license has 
been suspended or that it has expired, the defendant is entitled to 
an instruction setting forth his theory of the offense which would 
be an infraction instead of a misdemeanor. 
Since it is not possible to read a juror's mind, where he has 
been exposed to a conversation between the prosecuting attorney and 
the only witness in the case in which the case was discussed, there 
should be a mistrial to assure that the defendant receives a fair trial 
especially where it subsequently is shown that the juror exposed to 
the conversation may have been prejudiced. 
The defendant had to have knowledge that his license had been 
suspended before he should be found guilty of violating the law 
prohibiting driving while his license is suspended. 
While there is no rule against allowing a court bailiff to 
testify, the close relationship between a bailiff and a judge should 
compel the judge to employ another bailiff where the bailiff is 
the only witness in order to maintain the appearance of fairness. 
Even though it is true that the rules allow an information to 
be amended at almost anytime during the trial, where the state of 
Utah has made a motion to amend, the Court should rule upon the 
same prior to the beginning of the trial especially where the defendant 
has given a notice that he intends to present evidence of an alibi 
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as the date of the offense became critical to the case under such 
circumstances. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT GRANTING THE DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF A SPEEDY TRIAL. 
The Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court 
have stated that the right to a speedy trial is fact sensitive 
(see State v. Weddle, 29 Utah 2d 145, 506 P. 2d 67 [1973], Barker 
v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed 2d 101 [1972] 
and see also State v. Hoyt, 806 P. 2d 204 [Utah App. 1991]). 
In those cases eight factors are listed to be considered by the 
Court in determining whether or not the defendant has been denied 
his right to a speedy trial: (1) which party caused it; (2) whether 
it may have been willful and/or for some improper purpose; (3) 
whether the defendant was aware of his rights; (4) whether he made 
known his desire for a speedy trial; (5) whether by words or conduct 
there was explicit or implicit waiver; (6) whether the proceeding 
was completed as soon as reasonably could be done in the circum-
stances; (7) the length of delay; and (8) any prejudice to the defend-
ant. 
1. Which party caused the delay. The record is clear that 
the State of Utah caused the delay in this matter. Officer Meacham 
claims to have seen the defendant driving a motorcycle on May 16 
or May 17, 1991 at a time when he suspected his driver's license 
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had been suspended (T.-3 4). He did not give him a citation nor 
did he arrest him (T.-3 5 ). The defendant was scheduled to be 
in Circuit Court on another matter on June 3, 1991 at 4 p.m. (T-8 65) 
Just prior to 4 p.m. on June 3, 1991 Officer Meacham went before 
Judge Judkins (another Judge in the Circuit Court) and swore to 
the information in this case (R. 186). The information was not 
filed at that time but was held for three days and then filed 
at 11:08 a.m. on June 6, 1991 (R. 186). Nevertheless, Officer 
Meacham obtained a summons and served it or had it served on the 
defendant just prior to the hearing at 4 p.m. on June 3, 1991 (T^ 3 6,7). 
Officer Meacham did not tell the Circuit Judge who was handling 
the defendant's case on June 3, 1991 at 4 p.m. that he had just 
signed an information even though he was the bailiff in that case 
(T-3 7). (See also T-8 65-66.) 
The defendant was not asked to plead to the new information 
on June 3, 1991 when he was in court, nor was there an information 
on file on June 4, 1991, which was the first Tuesday after being 
served with a summons, to which he could have plead. The State 
of Utah further compounded the problem by not showing the 
address of the defendant on the return of service of summons 
as required by Utah Rules of C ivil Procedure, Rule 4(h)(1) made 
applicable to the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure by Rule 81(e) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Clerk was thus left 
without any information as to the correct address of the defendant 
to which notice could have been given after the information was 
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filed and the four random addresses chosen were not successful. 
Even though officer Meacham testified he had seen the defendant a 
number of times in Logan (Tr8 51), no effort was made to bring the 
defendant before the Court until he was arrested on another matter 
and brought before the Court on January 31, 1992 (R. 172). 
2. Was the delay willful or for some improper purpose. It 
is, of course, impossible to read the mind of law enforcement officers, 
but it is respectfully submitted it does seem strange that even though 
officer Meacham claims to have seen the defendant on May 16 or 17, 
1991 he did not issue him a citation nor place him under arrest. 
He does not file an information until he finds the defendant is 
appearing on another case where he is the bailiff, but then even 
after swearing to the information just prior to the hearing at 
4 p.m. on June 3, 1991 he does not file it until three days pass 
(R. 186 ) , he obtains a summons without filing the information or 
providing the judge with a probable cause statement as required by 
Rule 6(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, he serves or 
has the summons served just prior to the hearing but does not tell 
the judge that he has just sworn to an information, he does not obtain 
the current address of the defendant when the summons is served so 
that the clerk of the court can send a notice to the correct address, 
and then even though he testifies he sees the defendant around Logan 
from time to time (TT8 51)he makes no effort to have the defendant 
served with a warrant of arrest until the defendant appears on 
another matter. All this time he knows that if the defendant appeared 
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on the first Tuesday after service of the summons, which would have 
been June 4, 1991, there would be no information on file because it 
was not filed with the clerk of the court until June 6, 1991 at 11:08 
a.m. Certainly the facts indicate the delay was either willful or 
for some improper purpose. 
3. Whether the defendant was aware of his rights. There is 
nothing in the record that indicates the defendant was ever advised 
of his right to a speedy trial until his court appointed attorney 
filed a motion in the trial court on February 7, 1992 or nearly nine 
months after the officer claims to have seen the defendant driving 
on May 16 or 17, 1991. 
4. Whether the defendant made known his desire for a speedy 
trial. Since the defendant was not arraigned on June 3, 1991 when 
the officer should have brought the new information to the Court's 
attention and since there was no information on file on June 4, 1991 
when the defendant was supposed to appear it was impossible for the 
defendant to ever make a demand for a speedy trial until his counsel 
was appointed in February 1992. 
5. Whether the defendant used words or conduct to indicate 
he waived the right to a speedy trial. Except for the admission by 
the defendant's attorney that the defendant did not voluntarily 
appear on another matter there is nothing in the record that the 
defendant used words or conduct to indicate a waiver of a speedy 
trial until the defendant filed his motion to dismiss at which time 
he waived the right to a speedy trial until the court determined 
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the motion filed on February 7, 1992. 
6. Whether the proceedings were completed as soon as reasonably 
could be done in the circumstances. It is obvious that if the officer 
had issued a citation or placed the defendant under arrest when he 
claimed to have seen him driving on May 16 or 17, 1991 the proceedings 
could have been completed in a short time. It is obvious that if 
the officer after swearing to an information on June 3, 1991 just 
prior to the defendant's appearance in Court on another matter had 
brought the information to the Courtfs attention the proceedings could 
have been completed in a short time. It is obvious that if the 
information had been filed before the summons was issued as required 
by law (see Rule 6(a) Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure), if the 
defendant had failed to appear on June 4, 1991 as required by the 
summons a warrant could have been issued and matter completed in a 
short time. It is obvious that if the officer had placed the 
defendant's current address on the return of the service of summons 
(as required by Rule 4(h)(1) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) the 
proceedings could have been completed in a short time. But the 
failure of the officer to follow the required procedures caused a 
delay of nearly nine months before the defendant even knew of his 
right to a speedy trial. 
7. The length of the delay. While it is true that in State 
v. Trafny, 799 P 2d 704 (Utah 1990) the Utah Supreme Court allows 
delays of from 3% months to 12 months, all of these delays were 
contributed to by the defendant. The defendant cannot be charged 
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with any delay in this case. 
8. Any prejudice to the defendant. This is not a serious 
offense. The officer was confused at the hearing on April 3, 1992 
as to whether the defendant had been driving on May 16 or May 17, 
1991 (TT3 4-5). The defendant filed a notice of alibi thinking 
that the offense took place on May 16, 1991 as the state had moved 
to amend the information (Tr3 p.12), but because the defendant 
had no memory of what had happened on May 17, 1991 (nearly a year 
later) he was reluctant to take the witness stand. Our whole judicial 
system is built on fairness. Where the officer with his notes in 
front of him cannot remember nearly a year later when the alleged 
driving took place (Tr3 5), we should not expect the defendant to 
remember what he was doing at that time. Certainly the defendant 
has been prejudiced in his defense by the action of the state in 
keeping this case hid for nearly nine months before the defendant 
is required to plead. 
All of the essential elements which the Courts have used to 
evaluate whether or not the defendant has been denied the right to 
a speedy trial being in the defendant's favor, it is respectfully 
submitted that the trial court should have granted the defendant's 
motion to dismiss the information for failure to provide the 
defendant with a speedy trial under Article I, Section 12 of the 
Utah Constitution and Amendment VI of the United States Constitution. 
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POINT TWO: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT GRANTING THE MOTION TO 
DISMISS FOR DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS. 
The law is well settled that a State may not treat its citizens 
differently when bringing a criminal action. Amendment XIV of the 
United States Constitution and Section 24, Article I, of the Utah 
Constitution requires that all persons similarly situated must be 
treated alike. To single out the defendant as the only person who 
is charged with a violation of the driverfs license provisions where 
the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant 
did not have a valid driver's license (T-3 4); he claims to have 
seen the defendant driving on the highways of this state (T-3 4, 5) 
but did not as required by law either stop him and issue a citation 
to him or arrest him and take him before a magistrate (T-3 5), 
but some two and one-half weeks later swear to an information 
before a magistrate (R. 186) , obtain a summons from the magistrate 
(without first filing the information as required by Rule 6[a] 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure), cause it to be served on a 
Monday where the Summons required the defendant to appear on the 
First Tuesday after Service and then fail to file the Information 
with the clerk of the court until two days after the defendant 
was supposed to appear (R. 186), after serving the summons fail to 
inform the court before whom the defendant was appearing and where 
the same officer was the bailiff (R. 183) fail to inform the court 
that he had just sworn to an information (T^ 3 7), and where the 
officer serving the summons failed to note the place where the 
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defendant was served is to treat the defendant differently than 
all other persons are treated in similar situations in the State of 
Utah. 
In Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U. S. 584, 2 L ed 2d 991, 78 
S. Ct. 970, the United States Supreme Court said: "But no State is 
at liberty to impose upon one charged with crime a discrimination 
in its trial procedure which the Constitution, and an Act of Congress 
passed pursuant to the Constitution, alike forbid. Nor is this Court 
to grant or withhold the benefits of equal protection, which the 
Constitution commands for all, merely as we may deem the defendant 
innocent or guilty." 
Section 41-6-167, Utah Code Ann. 1953 is clear. It provides 
that "Upon any violation of this act (the Motor Vehicle Act under 
which the defendant is charged) punishable as a misdemeanor (the 
defendant was charged with a Class C Misdemeanor), whenever a person 
is (the word "not" should be inserted in the Code as it was inadvert-
antly omitted when the law was changed from the 1943 compilation of 
the Utah Code and Section 57-7-227, Utah Code Ann. 1943 includes the 
word "not" at this point) immediately taken before a magistrate as 
hereinbefore provided, the police officer shall prepare in triplicate 
or more copies a written notice to appear in court containing the 
name and address of such person . ." Upon claiming to have seen 
the defendant driving without a license on May 16 or May 17, 1991, 
the officer did not issue him a citation nor did he take him before 
a magistrate (T-3 5, 6). 
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Section 41-6-169 Utah Code Ann. 1953 allows an alternative 
procedure where the officer does not arrest the alleged offender or 
issue him a citation as provided in Section 41-6-167, supra. In this 
section of the code the legislature has authorized the arrest 
and prosecution in any other way provided by law. The legislature 
did not authorize the State of Utah to proceed by summons where 
the officer failed to comply with Section 41-6-167, supra. Had 
the officer asked the magistrate for a warrant of arrest he would 
have had to make an affidavit showing there is probable cause for 
the arrest (see Giordenello v. United States of America, 357 U. S. 
480, 2 L ed 2d 1503, 78 S. Ct. 1245 (1958) holding that mere recital 
of facts on a complaint is not sufficient for issuance of a warrant, 
but a neutral magistrate must determine probable cause). 
Indeed Rule 6(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
expressly requires the magistrate to determine there is probable 
cause before issuing either a warrant or a summons. In this case 
all the magistrate had before him was a conclusion of law sworn to 
on information and belief by the officer which did not allege any 
facts that the officer had personally witnessed the defendant driving 
or that the officer had knowledge from a particular source that the 
defendant's driver's license had been suspended. (See 5 Am Jur 2d 
Arrest Section 13 p. 706 and Section 14 p. 707 expressly stating that 
ffan affidavit that merely states belief in the guilt of the accused 
is insufficient to support a warrant of arrest . If) 
It is clear that the State of Utah failed to follow its own 
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procedures where the officer did not either issue the defendant 
a citation, or make an arrest without a warrant, or make an affidavit 
which established probable cause for issuance of a warrant or summons. 
Had the officer issued a citation or arrested the defendant 
when he claimed to have observed him on May 16 or 17, 1991 there 
would have been no question as to the date of the offense and 
probably no question as to whether or not the defendant was driving. 
Had the officer made an affidavit setting forth facts which justified 
the issuance of a warrant of arrest at the time he erroneously 
requested a summons, there would have been no doubt as to the date 
of the alleged offense and the affidavit would have been on file 
with the information for the defendant to examine at the time he 
was served with summons on June 3, 1991 and perhaps he could have 
remembered at that time where he was on May 16 or May 17, 1991- But 
permitting the State of Utah to disregard its procedures as was done 
in this case seriously interferes with the defendant's ability to 
defend himself and may result in an innocent person being punished 
for a crime which our system is intended to prevent. 
The Information should have been dismissed for failure to 
give the defendant equal protection of the laws. 
The procedure in this case disregarded the law in so many 
respects that the information should have been dismissed as the 
defendant was denied due process of law. (See Chambers v. Mississippi, 
410 U S 284, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 35 L ed 2d 297 (1973) where the Court said: 
"The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in 
-29-
essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the 
State f s accusations." 
POINT THREE: WHERE A TRAFFIC OFFENSE OCCURS PARTLY IN A JURISDICTION 
THAT HAS A JUSTICE COURT AND IT IS A CLASS C MISDEMEANOR, A CIRCUIT 
COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION. 
It is clear that Section 78-4-5 Utah Code Ann. 1953 in effect 
on January 1, 1992 gives Circuit Courts jurisdiction over Class C 
Traffic Offenses only where the case was properly filed prior to 
January 1, 1992. The facts in this case show the case was not pro-
perly filed prior to January 1, 1992. 
It is clear that officer Meacham testified that he observed 
the defendant driving a few blocks in Logan (T-%3, 8) and then about 
a mile and a half in River Heights (T-*8 56) . 
The laws of the State of Utah are silent with respect to a 
traffic offense over which a justice court has jurisdiction where it 
occurs partly in the geograpical boundaries of a muncipality where 
a justice court exists and partly within the geographical boundaries 
of a municipality where no justice court exists, but Sections 78-4-5 
Utah Code Ann. in effect on June 3, 1991 when the information was 
signed and Section 77-7-19(4)(b) Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, are 
clear that if the offense occurs within the geographical boundaries 
of a municipality where a justice court exists that justice court 
is the magistrate before whom the person should appear. 
Since the legislature has chosen not to make any exception to 
that rule, different interpretation would permit judge shopping 
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frowned upon by the Utah Supreme Court in Wells v. Logan City Court, 
535 P. 2d 683 (1975), Hillyard v. Logan City Court, 578 P 2d. 1270 
(1978), and Woytko v. Browning, 659 P 2d 1058 (1983). But in Mr. 
Dunbar!s case now before this court the problem is clearly one of 
jurisdiction and not one of venue and the legislature has chosen to 
give the municipal justice courts jurisdiction without exception 
if the offense occurs within their geographical limits. 
It is also clear that the information in this case can hardly 
be said to have been properly filed where a summons may not be issued 
before it is filed (see Rule 6(a) Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure) 
but a summons was issued and the information was not filed until 
three days after the issuance of the summons, the information was 
not filed with the circuit court judge as permitted by Rule 5(e) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, nor was the information filed 
without delay contrary to the intent of Rule 7(2) of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure. 
Since the Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction the matter 
should be remanded for a new trial in the River Heights Municipal 
Justice Court. 
POINT FOUR: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT REQUIRING THE CLERK TO 
DRAW THE JURY PANEL BY LOT INSTEAD OF SEATING THE PANEL IN 
ALPHABETICAL ORDER. 
Contrary to the express provisions of Rule 18(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure which requires that the clerk of the 
court "draw by lot11 the number of the jurors to try the cause plus 
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such additional number as will allow for all peremptory challenges 
permitted, the Court ordered all fifteen prospective jurors to be 
seated in alphabetical order (only ten names should have been drawn 
as only four jurors are required for Class C Misdemeanors [Section 
78-46-5(3) Utah Code Ann. 1953] and each side is allowed three 
peremptory challenges [Rule 18(d) Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure].) 
After each side had asked the jurors questions the jurors were 
allowed to remain seated in alphabetical order and the parties had 
to exercise their peremptory challenges based on the selection by 
alphabetical order instead of having the jurors drawn by lot (T-8 2). 
Clearly such a disregard for the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure should not be allowed to go unchallenged and the matter 
should be remanded for a new trial with the jury selected in a 
proper manner. (See State v. Bates, 22 Utah 65, 61 Pac. 905 [1900].) 
POINT FIVE: WHERE THE PROSPECTIVE JURORS WERE NOT WILLING TO GIVE 
THE DEFENDANT THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IF HE CHOSE NOT TO TESTIFY 
THE ENTIRE PANEL SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISCHARGED. 
Rule 18 (e) (14) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides in part that a juror is disqualified if "a state of mind 
exists on the part of the juror . . which will prevent him from acting 
impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the 
party . ." During voir dire counsel for the defendant asked the 
following: 
I can't read your minds, just like the prosecutor, but I'd 
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like to know, knowing what the Court's instructed you about 
the law about . . the defendant having the presumption of 
innocence, the State having to prove his guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and he doesnft have to take the witness 
stand unless we decided we want to put him on the witness 
stand; do any of you feel that if you were the defendant 
sitting here, and a juror was in your present frame of mind, 
you would want that person to sit on a jury? 
If you think that you have that frame of mind that you'd be 
willing to be in the position of the defendant under these 
conditions, would you please raise your hand? 
The record showed that Mrs. Price was the only juror to raise her 
hand (T-8 34). 
The defendant's challenge to the entire panel at this point 
is not recorded, but to avoid the possibility it was not the 
defendant made it matter of record that he did not accept the jury 
(T-8 34, 98). 
If all the jurors that sat on this case would not want a 
juror in their present frame of mind to sit in judgment if they 
were the defendant, surely the Court of Appeals should find as 
a matter of law that the jury were not impartial as required by 
Rule 18 (e) (14) supra. 
POINT NO. SIX: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT DECLARING A MISTRIAL 
WHEN THE PROSECUTION INTRODUCED EVIDENCE THAT PART OF THE ALLEGED 
DRIVING TOOK PLACE IN RIVER HEIGHTS WHERE THE COURT HAD PREVIOUSLY 
INSTRUCTED THE PROSECUTION THAT SUCH EVIDENCE WOULD NOT BE ADMITTED. 
Defendants motion for lack of jurisdiction was denied because 
the trial court felt if no evidence was presented that the defendant 
ever drove in River Heights there would be no question as to juris-
diction. (T-24 5, 8-11). Nevertheless the plaintiff asked the witness 
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how far he followed the defendant knowing the answer would place 
the defendant in River Heights (T-8 56, T-3 7-8). This problem 
arises because after the testimony the defendant renewed his objection 
as to lack of jurisdiction because the driving took place in River 
Heights which has a municipal justice court (T-8 84). Since 
the Court had previously denied that motion solely upon the basis 
that the State of Utah would not introduce any evidence of driving 
in River Heights, the Court should have declared a mistrial or 
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction 
(T-24 5, 5-11). (See also T-8 47.) 
POINT NO. SEVEN: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT GRANTING THE MOTION 
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT WHERE THE EVIDENCE SHOWED THE DEFENDANT'S 
LICENSE HAD EXPIRED ONE AND ONE HALF YEARS BEFORE THE ALLEGED CHARGE 
OF DRIVING ON SUSPENSION. 
Even though there was no evidence that the driving records 
introduced as Exhibit 1 were the driving records of the defendant 
Don W. Dunbar, if we assume that they were his driving records they 
clearly show that his driver's license expired on December 18, 1989. 
Accordingly the defendant moved for a directed verdict because 
the evidence showed his driverfs license had expired, it was therefore 
no longer suspended. (T-8 75-78) 
Section 41-2-102 (25) Utah Code Ann. 1953 as amended in effect 
on May 17, 1991 defines "Suspension11. It means "the temporary 
withdrawal by action of a division of a licensee's privilege to 
operate a motor vehicle." The legislature did not provide that the 
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term "suspension" included "expiration11 which means "termination 
from lapse of time" (Black1s Law Dictionary, 1979, West Publishing 
Co. p. 519). Some indication that the legislature did not intend 
to include "expiration" as part of the term, "suspension" is found 
in Section 41-12a-412 Utah Code Ann. 1953 as amended. In sub-paragraph 
(3) of that Section the legislature provides that a suspended license 
"may not be renewed, nor may any driver's license thereafter be issued" 
until proof of security is maintained. So the legislature recognized 
that after the license had expired it was no longer suspended, but even 
so no new license could be issued until proof of security was maintained. 
In sub-paragraph (5) the legislature provides that a nonresident's 
operating privilege "remains suspended or revoked" until proof of 
security is presented. If the legislature had meant the same provision 
to apply to a resident it could have said so, but the legislature 
recognized a non-resident could obtain a new license in another state, 
and so it specifically extended the period of suspension of the 
original driverfs license where a non-resident is involved. 
The defendant was charged with a violation of Section 41-2-
136 Utah Code Ann. 1953 as amended because his license was suspended 
and he drove. Since his license had expired he is not guilty of 
violating this section but only Section 41-2-104 Utah Code Ann. 1953 
as amended as he did not have a license. A violation of this section 
is only an infraction (see 41-6-12(2) Utah Code Ann. 1953). 
POINT NO. EIGHT: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT PERMITTING THE JURY 
TO CONSIDER A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF DRIVING WITHOUT A LICENSE. 
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For the reasons discussed under Point No. Seven the defendant 
requested an instruction that the jury may find the defendant guilty 
of driving without a license (T-8 91-93)*which the Court denied. It 
is respectfully submitted that where the evidence before the Court 
showed that the defendantfs license had expired prior to the time 
it was suspended, the jury as a fact finder (Section 77-17-10 Utah 
Code Ann. 1953 as amended) should have been entitled to consider 
whether or not the defendant was guilty of a lesser offense of 
driving without a license, an infraction. 
POINT NO. NINE: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING A MISTRIAL 
WHERE THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY AND THE STATE'S ONLY WITNESS DISCUSSED 
THE CASE IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY FOREMAN. 
During the trial a juror, Don Corbridge, admitted overhearing 
a conversation between the prosecutor and the state's only witness 
(T-8 82). He recognized the prosecutor and Mr. Meachan and heard 
ffMr. Perry's name" (T-8 82). After the time had expired for filing 
a motion for new trial it was learned that this same juror was the 
son of Mrs. Casper Merrill who was sueing her husband for a divorce 
and there was a considerable property settlement involved and Mr. 
Casper Merrill was represented by the firm to which the defendant's 
attorney belonged (R. 8-9). 
The defendant moved for a mistrial because "improper contacts 
may influence a juror in ways he or she may not even be able to 
recognize" (State v. Anderson, 65 Utah 415, 237 P. 941, 943 (1925) 
and see Logan City v. Carlsen, 799 P2d 224 [Utah App. 1990]) (T-8 84). 
*(R 58) 
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Even though the prosecutor had the burden of showing that the juror 
was not influenced the Court assumed the prosecutor's role and 
examined the juror (see State v. Pike, 712 P 2d 277 [Utah 1985]). 
Had the appropriate question of asking the juror if because Mr. 
Perry was involved in this case he had some reservations about his 
impartiality been asked it may have shown that in fact this juror 
was biased. In any event because of the concern raised in Point 
No. Five it would appear even this incidental contact with the 
prosecutor and the statefs witness may have prevented the defendant 
from receiving a fair trial. 
POINT NO. TEN: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT GRANTING A MOTION FOR 
A DIRECTED VERDICT WHERE THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SHOW THE DEFENDANT WAS 
GIVEN NOTICE OF SUSPENSION OR THAT HE WAS THE SAME PERSON NAMED 
IN THE DRIVING RECORDS. 
By stipulation the certified driving record of one Don W. 
Dunbar was received into evidence (T-8 58, 59). There was no 
stipulation that the Don W. Dunbar named in the driving record 
was the same Don W. Dunbar that Officer Meacham claimed to have 
seen driving on May 16, or May 17, 1991. There was no evidence 
that Mr. Dunbar ever received notice of any suspension or that he 
had ever lived at the address indicated on the driving records. 
Exhibit 1 did show that the notice mailed to the address on the 
driving record of the Dunbar named in the records was not delivered. 
Mr. Dunbar was faced with a difficult decision in this case. He 
could remember where he was on May 16, 1991 and when the State of 
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Utah moved to amend the information (T-3 12) he filed a notice to 
claim an alibi defense (T-24 11). But since he was not prepared 
to provide an alibi defense for May 17, 1991 at the time of trial 
it seemed the best course was to not testify since the State of 
Utah had failed to show that he was in fact the same Don W. Dunbar 
as was named of the certified copy of the driving record. 
The defendant moved for a directed verdict as there was no 
evidence that the Don W. Dunbar named in the driving record was 
the same Don W. Dunbar who appeared as the defendant (T-8 80). 
The Court did not find there was any such evidence but simply 
deferred the matter for the jury to consider (T-8 81).* 
Under Section 76-2-101 Utah Code Ann. 1953 as amended MNo 
person is guilty of an offense unless his conduct is prohibited by 
law and: (1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with 
criminal negligence, or with a mental state otherwise specified in 
the statute . " and this applies to offenses under Title 41 except 
for those offenses in Chapter 6. If there is no evidence before the 
Court that Don W. Dunbar the defendant was the same person as is 
named on the certified copy of the driving records then it seems it 
is impossible to find that he could act intentionally, knowingly, 
recklessly or with criminal negligence even though the jury may have 
believed he was driving on May 17, 1991. The Court of Appeals has 
insisted that a culpable mental state be found by the jury (see 
State v. Warden, 784 P 2d 1204 [Utah App. 1989] reversed State v. 
Warden, 813 P. 2d 1146 [Utah 1991]). It is respectfully submitted 
* See Appendix 
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that in absence of any evidence that the two Don W. Dunbar's are the 
same the Court should have granted a directed verdict (see State v. 
Strieby, 790 P. 2d 98 [Utah App. 1990] at p. 101 " . every element of 
the crime charged must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt" and 75A 
Am Jur 2d §910-912 Trial, p. 489-490). 
POINT NO. ELEVEN: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT SUA SPONTE REQUIRING 
ANOTHER BAILIFF TO ATTEND THE PROCEEDINGS ON APRIL 3, 1992 AND APRIL 
24, 1992 WHERE THE INFORMATION SHOWED THE BAILIFF WAS THE ONLY WITNESS 
FOR THE STATE IN THIS CASE. 
Admittedly this issue was properly raised by the State of Utah 
and counsel for the defendant did not object (T-3 2). Howver the de-
fendant Mr. Dunbar did object and as a result of the many unusual events 
that occurred in this entire procedure in connection with this defendant 
it appears that his objection may have been well taken. 
The Utah Code of Judicial Conduct requires the judge to avoid 
the appearance of impropriety in all activities and that he should 
perform his duties impartially. While to the lawyer who appears 
before the Court day after day there seldom arises a question of 
concern about judicial impropriety or impartiality (see Canon 2 and 
3 Utah Code of Judicial Conduct), an accused person may see things 
differently. That is the reason for avoiding the appearance of 
impropriety in all actions. 
Here James Meacham was the bailiff on June 3, 1991 when the 
Honorable Roger Dutson sat in the First Circuit Court and the de-
fendant Don W. Dunbar appeared in another matter (T-8 65, T-3 7). 
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Mr. Dunbar was served with a summons that said an information 
had been filed, but he was not asked to plead to the information 
even though he was present in Court. Nearly a year later on April 
3, 1992 he comes into court believing that there is something wrong 
with a procedure that would hide an information for a long time 
(in fact not even file it until after he had appeared in court 
even though the summons said it had been filed) and the first person 
he sees is that same bailiff that served him with a summons but 
failed to file the information as required by law nearly a year 
before. Under such circumstances one can excuse the defendant for 
telling his attorney to object because the state's only witness in 
this case was the bailiff who seems to have access to the judge 
presiding as both enter together and leave together (T-3 3). 
POINT NO. TWELVE: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT RULING UPON THE 
STATE'S MOTION TO AMEND THE INFORMATION MADE ON APRIL 3, 1992 TO 
CHANGE THE DATE OF THE OFFENSE TO MAY 16, 1991 AS WITH THE MOTION 
PENDING THE DEFENDANT COULD NOT PRESENT EVIDENCE OF AN ALIBI NOR 
COULD THE DEFENDANT EXERCISE HIS RIGHT TO TESTIFY IN HIS OWN BEHALF 
WITHOUT KNOWING WITH CERTAINTY THE DATE OF THE ALLEGED OFFENSE. 
At the hearing on April 3, 1992 the State of Utah moved to 
amend the information to state the date of the offense as May 16, 
1991 (T-3 12, 21). At that hearing nor in later discovery did the 
State of Utah ever indicate to the defendant that it would withdraw 
its motion and stay with the May 17, 1991 date. Thereafter the 
defendant did some research and filed a notice of alibi for May 16 
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1991. The defendant was prepared to testify as to his doings on 
May 16, 1991, but felt that without further research he could not 
take the witness stand and testify as to May 17, 1991. His dilemma 
has been discussed under point no. ten. (See also T-8 68.) 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution requires the 
State of Utah to inform the defendant of the nature and cause of 
the accusation against him. Rules 4 and 16 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure indicate that the defendant is entitled to know 
the date of the offense where it is necessary to avoid the defendant 
being punished twice for the same offense. Rule 1 of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure requires "fairness in administration." It is 
respectfully submitted that where the State of Utah furnishes discovery 
that raises some question about the date of the offense, where the 
officer upon reviewing his notes decides that the offense occurred 
on May 16, 1991 but then later changes his mind but never notifies 
the defendant until he testifies at the time of trial, there is no 
compliance with the requirements of the Utah Constitution nor is 
there any fairness in the administration of justice to this defendant. 
In McNair v. Hayward, 666 P. 2d 321 (Utah 1983) the Utah 
Supreme Court said " . time is always an essential element of a crime 
in the sense that due process requires than accused be given 
sufficiently precise notification of the date of the alleged crime 
that he can prepare his defense." How can it be said the defendant 
could prepare his defense when the State had a motion to amend the 
information to change the date to May 16, 1991 (T-3 12) before the 
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trial court which the court had taken under advisement and the first 
indication the defendant had that the State would not proceed with 
its motion was when officer Meacham took the witness stand. 
CONCLUSION 
"While it is true that no precise definition of the phrase 
1
 due process of law1 can be given, the courts have frequently defined 
the phrase in general terms. It has been said that due process of law 
must be understood to mean law in the regular course of administration 
through courts of justice according to those rules and forms which 
have been established for the protection of private rights." (See 
16A Am Jur 2d Constitutional Law §808, p. 960.) 
The defendant came to the First Circuit Court of the State of 
Utah expecting to be accorded due process of law. A couple of matters 
in this record and this appeal indicates that he did not feel he was 
given "law in the regular course of administration through courts of 
justice" (16A Am Jur 2d Constitutional Law, supra.) 
At the first hearing in this matter he expressed his concern 
that the only witness in the case was also the bailiff and seemingly 
had access to the Court when the defendant was not present (T-3 4): 
"Mr. Dunbar says there is a problem . ." with James Mecham serving 
as bailiff. At the conclusion of the trial he expressed concern 
about the testimony of Mr. Meacham: " . but part of it is the outrage 
over the license being revoked or suspended due to an officerfs 
perjury in the first place." (T-8 134)* 
*See in the Appendix Officer Meacham1s contradictory testimony that 
he had and did not have the driving records on May 17, 1991. 
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The defendant could reasonable conclude that he was not 
getting the fair hearing to which he was entitled by the Court's 
final comments to Mr. Dunbar: 
. you've been a real pain in the ass to a lot of 
people around here, you know that. You've done some 
things that you know you shouldn't have done (T-8 p. 137) 
If that statement was not enough to indicate to the defendant that 
perhaps the system was working against him the Court went on to 
say: 
. . I feel sometimes like coming off the bench and hitting 
you on the head with a two-by-four to get your attention, 
but that wouldn't do any good. . (T-8 137). 
The record in this case shows that the defendant's prior 
driving record (if we can accept Exhibit 1 as being the defendant's 
driving record), involved only a refusal to submit to a breath test 
and a subsequent driving under the influence conviction. It is 
respectfully submitted that such a record hardly requires the 
above comments of the Court unless the Court may have learned some 
additional information through the bailiff that is not part of the 
record. Under the possibility of that this may be the reason for 
the Court's comments, it is respectfully submitted that the Court 
of Appeals should carefully consider the questions raised in this 
appeal. 
First there is the question of lack of a speedy trial solely 
because the bailiff, the complaining officer, James Meacham,did not 
follow the usual procedure in this case of stopping the defendant 
when he suspected he was driving on suspension and issuing him a 
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citation, but waiting nearly three weeks until he knew the defendant 
would be in court on another matter and serving him with a summons 
without filing the information or bringing it to the Court's 
attention and then not filing it until two days after the defendant 
was supposed to appear. Surely the Court of Appeals should not 
condone such unfair action on part of an officer of this state and 
as a bar to future officers who may want to cause an accused person 
a serious inconvenience, the Court of Appeals should dismiss this 
entire procedure as a violation of the defendant's rights to a speedy 
trial under the Utah and the United States Constitutions. 
Second, if the Court of Appeals does not want to establish 
a precedent that errors of an officer should be grounds for denial 
of a speedy trial in absence of some effort of the defendant to 
exercise that right, then surely the unusual actions of Officer 
Meacham in this case failing to issue a citation to the defendant 
or even calling his attention to the fact the the officer had 
observed him driving, and then waiting three weeks until the 
defendant was in court on another matter and signing the information 
but failing to have it brought to the defendant's attention while 
he is in court and making sure that if he does appear the next 
day on the summons as he is supposed to do, making sure that no 
information is on file to which the defendant can enter a plea, 
then filing the information after the date the defendant is supposed 
to appear so that the Court can issue a bench warrant without a 
probable cause statement from the officer that would help the 
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defendant in preparing his defense warrants a finding that the 
defendant has been denied equal protection and due process of the 
law under the Utah and the United States Constitutions. 
Third, if the Court of Appeal does not feel the unusual action 
of the officer is sufficient to discharge the defendant, then surely 
this is the time to clarify the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts 
and Municipal Justice Courts when a traffic offense, a Class C 
Misdemeanor occurs partly within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the Municipal Court and partly within the territorial jurisdiction 
of the Circuit Court. It is respectfully submitted that the intent 
of the legislature seems clear that it is intended that when such 
occurs there should be no opportunity for judge shopping but all 
Class C Misdemeanor traffic offenses should be filed in the Municipal 
Justice Courts if they would have jurisdiction. 
Fourth, it seems there is no question but that the lower court 
should be informed that it is improper to seat the jury in alphabetical 
order since the Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly require that the 
names chosen for the jury panel should be drawn by lot so that the 
Roe's have an equal chance to sit on a the jury as the Doe's. 
Fifth, it is respectfully submitted that every defendant is 
entitled to have a jury that is impartial sit in judgment and if 
the jurors have some personal feelings that would make them think 
they would not like a juror in their same frame of mind to sit on 
their case, that juror should be excused. In this case all the 
prospective jurors except one felt they would not like a juror in the 
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same frame of mind as they were to sit on the case if they were the 
defendant. 
Sixth, it is unfair to a defendant to come to court thinking 
that no evidence will be presented that he drove in River Heights 
and then have the State of Utah elicit that evidence from the witness 
in violation of a direct court order. 
Seventh, where the statutes regarding driver's licenses are 
ambiguous to say the least and it is clear that if Exhibit 1 referred 
to the driving record of the defendant he was entitled to a directed 
verdict as the evidence showed his license had expired after it was 
suspended. 
Eighth, it was apparent from the record that if Exhibit 1 did 
refer to the driving record of the defendant it showed that his 
driver's license had expired, and he was therefore entitled to have 
the jury determine the factual situation of whether he was driving 
with an expired driver's license or one that was still in effect but 
temporarily suspended, as he was entitled to have the lesser offense 
submitted to the jury as an alternative verdict. 
Ninth, a defendant is always concerned when a juror hears a 
conversation regarding the case outside of the court room, and no 
amount of testimony will ever convince the losing defendant that 
something improper was not said. This was especially significant 
in this case as there may be some question as to the juror's 
impartiality because of evidence which arose after the time had 
expired for filing a motion for new trial. The defendant should be 
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given a new trial to be sure that he received a verdict from a 
jury in which all members were impartial and did not receive evidence 
outside of the court room. 
Tenth, the defendant realizes that he must martial all the 
evidence which supports the jury's verdict where he asks for a reversal 
by the Court of Appeal, but there is simply not one statement in the 
entire record that the driving record of Don W. Dunbar named in 
Exhibit 1 is the same Don W. Dunbar named as defendant in this case. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Court of Appeals should not 
allow prosecutor's to get sloppy and omit essential testimony even 
where the case involves a small matter, a Class C Misdemeanor, as it 
is at this stage the great majority of the citizens of this state get 
their understanding of the importance of having a government of laws 
and not a government of men who may assume facts not in evidence 
because they assume common sense tells them they are doing the right 
thing. Allowing sloppy procedure will eventually result in the 
innocent being convicted and that is most certainly contrary to the 
laws and constitutions of this state and the United States of America. 
Eleventh, the Court of Appeals should use this case to instruct 
trial judges that the lay person in court may see things a little 
differently and allowing a person to serve as bailiff with access 
to the judge where the bailiff is the only witness does not present 
an appearance of fairness regardless of whether or not any prejudice 
resulted. 
Twelfth, the trial court cannot use the procedure of taking 
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motions under advisement where substantial rights of a defendant 
are involved such as the right to know the precise date on which 
the alleged offense occurred. The defendant views this as a serious 
breach of his right to a fair trial and he fully intends to find 
an alibi witness for the May 17, 1991 date if the Court of Appeal 
grants him a new trial as it should do where the actions of the 
trial court seriously interfered with his opportunity to adequately 
prepare for trial. 
In view of the many errors, it is respectfully submitted that 
the Utah Court of Appeals should reverse the decision of the trial 
court and discharge the defendant or at the very least remand the 
case for a trial using correct and fair procedures which will 
assure the defendant of having a trial governed by the same rules 
as are applied to all defendants and a fair opportunity to defend 
himself. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this JO day of July, 1992. 
^ji 
Te/ S. Perry / 
Attorney for ^ Defendant and 
Appellant 
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APPENDIX 
Under the rule requiring the appellant to martial all the 
evidence which sustains the verdict where the appellant claims the 
trial court erred in not granting a motion for a directed verdict, 
the following is presented as all the evidence in the record from 
which the jury could find that the Don W. Dunbar named in Exhibit 
1 was the same person as is named as the defendant in this action: 
Under direct examination of James Meacham by the State the following 
appears: 
Q. After you observed the defendant driving this motor vehicle, did 
you then make a determination, through the State of Utah, as to 
whether he possessed a valid driver's license in the State of 
Utah? 
MR. PERRY: Just a moment, your Honor. I think the evidence of 
what the status of his license was will be contained in the 
report, not what his personal observation is, and I think his 
personal observation is hearsay. 
THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection. Itfs my understanding 
that there has been a stipulation that the certified driving 
record can be received. (T-8 58) 
Is that correct Counsel? 
MR. PERRY: That's correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. If that could be marked then and that 
will be admitted as an exhibit. And I111 direct that the jury 
may consider that as proven because there has been a stipulation; 
in other words, the exhibit will be available for you and admitted 
as evidence. 
Q. (By Mr. Preston) Showing you what has been marked for identifica-
tion as Plaintifffd Exhibit--
MR. PRESTON: Well, at this time, I'd offer into evidence 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, Counsel. 
MR. PERRY: No objection, your Honor. 
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THE COURT: Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 is admitted. 
Q. (By Mr. Preston) Show you what has been marked for identification 
as Plaintiff1s Exhibit 1. Just for purposes of identification, 
the — the top sheet on that is a certification by the records 
officer, is it not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the second page down is —is a printout from a— 
MR. PERRY: Well, your Honor, I donft know that the jury needs 
an explanation of what the exhibit is. They can read. And I 
think we donft need further comment by counsel or the witness 
as to what is says. (T-8 59) 
THE COURT: The best--the best evidence, it would seem would be 
the document itself. You may ask questions about whether or not 
he has taken action on it or something, but I think the best 
evidence would be the document itself. 
Where are we going with this? 
MR.PRESTON: Let me ask—well, let me ask this question then. 
Q. (By Mr. Preston) Did—have you seen a copy of that prior to this 
time? 
A. Yes. I have. 
Q. After you saw Don Dunbar driving, did you obtain a copy of that, 
or other duplicate copies of that document? 
A. Yes, sir. I made the request for the— 
MR. PERRY: I think the question can be answered yes or no. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
Q. (By Mr. Preston) As a result of that, did you make a determination 
as to whether or not he had in fact committed a criminal offense 
in your presence? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that offense was what? 
MR. PERRY: Well, just a minute. I think the document speaks 
for itself and now hefs invading the province of the jury. 
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THE COURT Well-- (T-8 60) 
MR. PRESTON: Well, I think— 
THE COURT: --if you'll rephrase that question, I'll allow it, 
but — 
Q. (By Mr. Preston) Let me put it this way: As a result of reading 
that document, did you then sign an Information charging Don 
Dunbar with driving during suspension? 
A. Yes.- I did. (T-8 61) . . . 
Q. (By Mr. Preston) Had you at that time--did you at that time, 
have the documentation from the State of Utah evidencing the 
fact that he was on suspension? 
A. Yes. I was already— 
MR. PERRY: Objection, your Honor. I think-- (T-8 73) 
THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection as to the character-
ization of the documents; however, you may rephrase the 
question. 
Q. (By Mr. Preston) Did you have any personal knowledge of whether 
or not the defendant did or did not have a driver's license at 
that time? 
MR. PERRY: Well, just a moment, your Honor. He can ask the 
question when he received the documents from the State of Utah. 
The question the Court struck out is what it said, and that's 
what I objected to. Now personal knowledge obviously doesn't--
THE COURT: Sustain—sustain the objection. You may rephrase 
the question. 
Q. (By Mr. Preston) Exhibit—where is the exhibit? 
A. Right here. 
Q. Exhibit 1 is dated—Exhibit 1 is dated by the State of Utah, 
on June 10th; is that correct? 
A June 10th, 1991. 
''Note Officer Meacham testifies he read Exhibit 1 on June 3 when he 
signed the Information even though Exhibit 1 was not prepared until 
June 10th. 
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Q. So, therefore, that document was not in your possession at that 
time? On the 17th of May? 
A. This certified copy was not, that is correct. (T-8 74) 
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